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Suggested substitute for section D of OIR draft contribution to NIE-19.

D. Soviet and Chinese Communist reactions to a US declaration to rearm Japan.

11 The USSR

Soviet propaganda in the postwar period has consistently changed US remilitarization of Japan and Soviet leaders must have realized that their policies would eventually bring about such a development. Nevertheless, the Kremlin would undoubtedly view Japanese rearmament, particularly in conjunction with US, Western European and German rearmament, as a grave threat to Soviet objectives and ultimately the USSR itself.

The Soviet reaction would depend in part on the extent of Japanese rearmament. A modest and perhaps unannounced program of creating further paramilitary forces and building up a nucleus for a future Japanese Army, Navy and Air Force could probably be undertaken without evoking more than further and probably intensified charges of American aggressive intentions. Japanese rearmament on a broader scale, would produce a more violent reaction, probably including diplomatic moves, and perhaps paralleling current Soviet reactions to West German rearmament. The existence or absence of a Japanese peace treaty, signed by most of the belligerents but not the USSR and Communist China, would probably not affect the Soviet reaction itself, but the existence of a treaty might limit the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda aimed at former victims of Japanese aggression.

The USSR would probably see numerous possibilities in the situation for thwarting or limiting Japanese rearmament. The USSR could attempt to increase and exploit Japanese fears, threatening Japan with warnings of fatal consequences such as are now being directed to Western Germany. The continuation of a technical state of war between the USSR and Communist China on the one hand and Japan on the other would be most useful to the USSR in this respect. Restoration of Japanese

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sovereignty, if a peace treaty should be signed, would also provide the USSR with the possibility of exploiting Japanese desires for trade and Japan's recognition of its military vulnerability. The USSR, through its own propaganda media and local Communist parties could also play on the fears and memories of the population of Southeast Asia in an effort to both limit Japanese rearmament and to promote division between the US and its Asian Allies. Furthermore, Soviet threats as to the consequences of Japanese rearmament need not be limited to Asia, and the USSR could exploit the situation in an effort to further the break between the US and its European Allies already evident in European concern over US policy in Asia.

The likelihood of an eventual Soviet resort to war, probably in conjunction with Communist China, cannot be assessed with any degree of accuracy and such a decision on the part of the USSR would depend on a number of outside factors. The most important of these would be the overall international situation and the Soviet estimate of the ^{ROLE} ~~role~~ that a rearmed Japan would play in the balance of power. Other factors might be the military situation in Asia, the degree of Chinese Communist involvement in hostilities in Korea or elsewhere, the ~~substantial~~ extent to which West European, particularly West German, rearmament had developed, and the tempo of Japanese rearmament.

2. Communist China

In general, Communist China's reaction to the rearmament of Japan would supplement that of the USSR. Communist propaganda charges of the aggressive intent of Japan and the US would gain additional force, although this might be tempered somewhat by growing disillusionment and dislike of the regime. Chinese Communist plans, as well as the Kremlin's, have probably been made in the realization that Communist policies would eventually result in Japanese rearmament. A Chinese Communist decision to attempt to thwart rearmament through an attack on Japan would

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depend primarily on (1) the degree to which the Chinese Communists are willing to embark on a military venture which would depend heavily on Soviet logistic support and the degree to which the USSR is willing or able to supply such support, and (2) the degree to which the Chinese Communists, acting in concert with the USSR, are willing to run the risk of war with the US. To a lesser extent Chinese and Soviet views might be influenced by the degree to which, in their estimation, the danger of Japan is offset by an expectation that Japan — rearmed or not — is in the long run so dependent upon the trade and resources of the Asiatic mainland and so vulnerable militarily as to make inevitable a Japanese accommodation with the Soviet bloc.

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